铸造砂箱Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: an empirical investigation
期刊名称： Strategic Management Journal程控步进衰减器系统
年份： 2008年
期号： 第8期
关键词： Practical/ organisational aspects; recruitment; termination of喷淋嘴
employment/ chief executive officers; newly appointed CEOs; board-of-directors;红外线测高仪
firm performance; CEO dismissal/ E0120B General management E0120M Human resource management E0110 Organisational aspects
摘要：Why are some newly appointed CEOs (i.e., those with tenure of three years or less) dismissed while others are not? Drawing upon previous reseach on information asymmetry and adverse selection
in CEO selection, I argue that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession, and as a result must dismiss the appointee after succession when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of succession increases the likelihood of dismissal. With data on 204 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support this argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal (e.g., firm performance and political factors), the results show that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs
is higher in outside successions and/or
热熔胶网膜
